Safety culture and reasons for risk-taking at a large steel-manufacturing company: Investigating the worker perspective  by Nordlöf, Hasse et al.
Safety Science 73 (2015) 126–135Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /ssc iSafety culture and reasons for risk-taking at a large steel-manufacturing
company: Investigating the worker perspectivehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.11.020
0925-7535/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 26 648457; fax: +46 26 648686.
E-mail address: hasse.nordlof@hig.se (H. Nordlöf).Hasse Nordlöf a,⇑, Birgitta Wiitavaara a, Ulrika Winblad b, Katarina Wijk c,d, Ragnar Westerling b
aCentre for Musculoskeletal Research, Department of Occupational and Public Health Sciences, Faculty of Health and Occupational Studies, University of Gävle, SE 801 76
Gävle, Sweden
bDepartment of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Uppsala University, Sweden
cDepartment of Public Health Medicine, County Council Gävleborg, Sweden
d Faculty of Educational Science, Uppsala University, Swedena r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 12 December 2013
Received in revised form 14 November 2014
Accepted 23 November 2014
Available online 11 December 2014
Keywords:
Occupational health and safety (OHS)
Safety culture
Risk-taking
Steel manufacturing
Qualitative content analysis
Concept of human-technology-organization
(HTO)a b s t r a c t
Workers in the steel-manufacturing industry face many safety risks due to the nature of the job. How
well safety procedures and regulations are followed within an organization is considered to be inﬂuenced
by the reigning culture of the organization. The aim of this study was to investigate and describe safety
culture and risk-taking at a large steel-manufacturing company in Sweden by exploring workers’
experiences and perceptions of safety and risks. Ten focus group interviews were conducted with a total
of 66 workers. In the interviews, the situation of safety at work was discussed in a semi-structured
manner. The material was analyzed inductively using qualitative content analysis. The analysis resulted
in a thorough description of safety culture and risk-taking at the company, based on the following ﬁve
main categories: 1. Acceptance of risks, one simply has to accept the safety risks of the work environment,
2. Individual responsibility for safety, the responsibility for safe procedures rests to the largest extent on
the individual, 3. Trade-off between productivity and safety, these are conﬂicting entities, wanting to
produce as well as wanting to work safely, 4. Importance of communication, it is needed for safety actions
to be effective, and 5. State-of-the-day and external conditions, an interplay between these factors affect
risk-taking. In sociotechnical systems theory it is acknowledged that there are interactions between
social and technical factors in organizations. The ﬁndings of this study are interpreted to be in line with
a sociotechnical understanding of safety culture and risk-taking.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction ing plants constitute, the companies need to assure safe workingSteel manufacturing is an industry where safe working proce-
dures are important, as workers face many risks due to the nature
of the job. The work environment is often hot and noisy, and work
tasks regularly heavy and demanding on the body, and there is an
always present risk for crushing injuries and burns. Figures from
Sweden show that metalworkers were subjected to the largest
number of accidents annually (2006–2010) compared to other
occupations (AFA Insurance, 2012). The risk for new cases of
long-term sick leave (>90 days) for metalworkers was more than
double that of the average worker (AFA Insurance, 2012). Metal-
workers also had the largest number of cases of recognized
work-related diseases among Swedish occupational groups during
2008 and 2009, with 0.7 cases per 1000 employed (AFA Insurance,
2012). Due to the types of risky workplaces that steel manufactur-conditions through systematic and regular safety audits and risk
analyses (AFS, 2001; SFS, 1977; 89/391/ECC). Safety procedures
and regulations need to be followed by the management as well
as the workers.
Howwell safety procedures and regulations are followed within
an organization is considered to be inﬂuenced by the reigning cul-
ture of the organization (Antonsen, 2009a; Guldenmund, 2010;
Hopkins, 1999). Organizational accidents have been associated
with a poor safety culture, as, for example, in the two space shuttle
accidents and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (CAIB, 2003; IAEA,
1992; Vaughan, 1996). Safety culture is regularly mentioned as
an important concept in understanding the state of safety in orga-
nizations, and is thereby thought a relevant phenomenon to study
(Choudhry et al., 2007; Edwards et al., 2013; Mearns and Flin,
1999). Because of the risks and the importance of safety in the
steel-manufacturing context, the focus of the present study is to
examine safety culture and risk-taking in the steel-manufacturing
industry.
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over the years and there is no established deﬁnition (Choudhry
et al., 2007; Edwards et al., 2013; Guldenmund, 2010). There is a
necessity to return to the roots of culture in order to gain a better
understanding of what is meant by safety culture (Antonsen,
2009b; Edwards et al., 2013; Haukelid, 2008; Myers et al., 2014).
A known sociological deﬁnition is that ‘‘Culture consists of the
values the members of a given group hold, the norms they follow,
and the material goods they create’’ (Giddens, 1989, p. 31). Values
are ‘‘abstract ideals,’’ perceptions of what is right and wrong and
how things should and should not be (Giddens, 1989, p. 31). Norms
are ‘‘deﬁnite principles or rules which people are expected to
observe,’’ the rules governing social conduct and the behaviors that
are accepted or not (Giddens, 1989, p. 31). Values and norms are
learned by socialization—humans learning from others in groups;
hence culture is learned by socialization. Safety culture can be
understood as ‘‘an analytical concept, not an empirical entity’’
(Antonsen, 2009a, p. 243), meaning that safety culture is a label
that represents the relationship between culture and safety, and
not a separate entity on its own. In line with Giddens’s (1989)
deﬁnition of culture, Mearns and Flin (1999) described safety
culture as normative beliefs and fundamental values, assumptions,
expectations, philosophies, norms, and rules, with regard to safety
at a workplace. Earlier studies on safety culture have applied the
concept to organizations in two different ways: (1) by assuming
that every organization has a safety culture (and that it therefore
can vary in the extent to which it is strong/positive or weak/
negative), or (2) by assuming that it is organizations that are really
committed to safety that have a safety culture (Hopkins, 2006).
This study agrees with the ﬁrst description, that every organization
has a safety culture that may affect safety.
Some earlier studies on safety in a steel-manufacturing context
have focused on behavior, attitudes, climate, or culture, with
results indicating that culture can form a basis for unsafe attitudes
and behavior (Brown et al., 2000; Canter, 1996; Turtiainen and
Vaananen, 2012; Watson et al., 2005). Both negative and positive
examples of safety culture are described in previous research. In
a study of a coal mining accident it was found that two unfortunate
cultural expressions paralyzed the organization’s ability to
acknowledge warning signs before the accident occurred. The ﬁrst
was the ‘‘belief that it was important to rely on personal experi-
ence in assessing the evidence’’ (Hopkins, 1999, p. 148) and
therefore to systematically discount the reports of others, and
the second was ‘‘a culture of denial, an elaborate set of beliefs
which held that ‘it could not happen here’’’ (Hopkins, 1999,
p. 141). In contrast to this, three of the most important cultural
expressions for achieving an adequate safety culture have been
found to be ‘‘looking for errors, not keeping out of sight when dif-
ﬁcult situations arise, and resolving conﬂicts constructively’’
(García-Herrero et al., 2013, p. 94). Management’s commitment
to safety stands out among earlier ﬁndings as a key factor associ-
ated with positive safety culture, positive employee safety behav-
ior, and positive employee safety attitudes (Biggs et al., 2013;
Cox et al., 1998; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007). Workers’ belief in
the safety values of the management has been linked to predicting
worker risk behavior (Watson et al., 2005). The concept of risk is
deﬁned as ‘‘the possibility that something unpleasant or unwel-
come will happen,’’ and as a verb, risk means to ‘‘expose (someone
or something valued) to danger, harm, or loss’’ (Oxford
Dictionaries, 2013). Norms shared by employees have been shown
to predict perceptions of safety as well as risk behavior (Watson
et al., 2005). Other key factors that have been shown to be associ-
ated with an organizations’ safety culture are the employee
involvement and personal actions for safety (Cox et al., 1998;
Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007); the quality of employee safety
training (Cox et al., 1998); and the safety management system(Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007). It has been shown that workers
manifest less ambivalence toward using personal protective
equipment when they perceive that there is an atmosphere in
the organization that supports safety (Cavazza and Serpe, 2009).
It has been shown that it is possible to change a safety culture,
as exempliﬁed in an oil-drilling context; however, it takes a long
time (Haukelid, 2008).
Safety culture has earlier been studied using three main
directions of methodology: perception surveys (questionnaires),
ethnography, and assembled material from major accident inqui-
ries (Hopkins, 2006). Relatively few empirical studies on safety cul-
ture have, so far, used qualitative methodology (Glendon, 2008;
Guldenmund, 2010). A qualitative methodology considered as suit-
able when investigating cultural values and group norms is focus
group interviewing (Hughes and DuMont, 1993; Kitzinger, 1995).
Culture is a complex phenomenon to study. With perception sur-
veys (questionnaires) it is possible to study safety culture from
one viewpoint; with a qualitative study approach it is possible to
do it from another, enabling a more detailed and in-depth descrip-
tion, which can be done inductively. It has been suggested that the
concept of safety culture is best suited to be understood in a speciﬁc
context (Richter and Koch, 2004). The context of the present study
is steel manufacturing. As this is a high-risk work environment,
there is a need to improve the safety of the work conditions for
steelworkers. One way to achieve this is to improve the under-
standing of safety culture and risk-taking in this context. Safety
rules and regulations at the workplace are formalized norms, and
ofﬁcially expressed. To expect compliance with rules is a certain
kind of communication—it is a request (Cialdini and Trost, 1998).
The more compliant workers are with safety rules, the better the
safety culture is thought to be (Simard and Marchand, 1997). This
investigation however, focuses on values and norms of safety that
are not written down, not ofﬁcially expressed, informal norms,
but which—socially, in any case—inﬂuence safety actions and
behavior. In a best-case scenario, the formal and informal norms
in an organization match up, in that it is speciﬁed by the culture
that it is important to comply with safety rules and not to violate
them. However, regardless of formal or informal, in order for norms
to have any effect on behavior they need be communicated
between humans—they need to be shared, otherwise they do not
exist (Cialdini and Trost, 1998).
The aim of the present study was to investigate and describe
safety culture and risk-taking in the steel-manufacturing industry
by exploring workers’ experiences and perceptions of safety and
risks.2. Material and methods
2.1. Study design
The present study was designed to be a descriptive focus group
interview study, with an inductive and explorative approach. Focus
group interviewing was used, as it is a method considered appro-
priate when aiming to explore cultural values and group norms,
by identifying shared knowledge and experiences within groups
(Hughes and DuMont, 1993; Kitzinger, 1995). Qualitative content
analysis was used in the analysis of data (Graneheim and
Lundman, 2004).
2.2. Study context: A steel-manufacturing company
The present study took place at a large steel-manufacturing
company in a county in central Sweden. The company exempliﬁes
a typical industrial works community that one ﬁnds in many
smaller towns in Sweden, where the works has played a central
Table 1
Departments and participants included in the focus groups.
Focus group no. Department Acronym No. of participants
1 Ring Mill RM, 1 6
2 Hot Rolled Tubes Mill HRTM, 2 9
3 Hot Rolled Tubes Mill HRTM, 3 6
4 Billet Mill BM, 4 6
5 Cold Rolled Tubes Mill CRTM, 5 8
6 Ring Mill RM, 6 7
7 Billet Mill BM, 7 5
8 Cold Rolled Tubes Mill CRTM, 8 7
9 Steel Mill SM, 9 6
10 Steel Mill SM, 10 6
Total 66
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is the main employer of the inhabitants of the town, besides the
municipality, and there is often more than one generation of a
family working at the company. The local area has a tradition of
producing steel that dates back to the 17th century. In earlier times
ore was used as rawmaterial, but nowadays scrap metal is used for
the steel making. Today the company is part of a corporate group
producing steel products in several places around northern Europe,
which at the time of the study employed about 4000 people. At the
company studied there are about 1000 employees allocated to ﬁve
departments: the steel mill, billet mill, ring mill, hot rolled tubes
mill, and cold rolled tubes mill.
The company was chosen as study context, since it represents a
workplace with a variety of internal risks because of the nature of
the industrial work. The work is often heavy and demanding on the
body, and it is a hot, sweaty, and sooty environment. In some pro-
duction lines the steel is hot and the risk for burns is present, while
in others there is processing of cold steel, and the risk for crushing
injuries is present along with a noisier environment. Some blue-
collar staff work close to the production line, while others operate
in a cockpit, supervising the production line or controlling a crane.
Some staff work in maintenance, and are thereby subjected to fur-
ther risks because of the need to troubleshoot the machines when
they fail. Newly invested machines have modern and effective
built-in safety procedures, while other machines from, for exam-
ple, the 1960s involve more risks, since it is easy to access moving
parts of the machines because of the way they are constructed. The
modern standards for built-in safety in machines, demanded by
European (2006/42/EC) and Swedish (AFS 2008:3) safety regula-
tions, are not imposed retroactively, meaning that it is not required
to rebuild old production lines.
The company follows Swedish laws and regulations for occupa-
tional health and safety (AFS, 2001; SFS, 1977), as well as European
(89/391/ECC). In accordance with the Swedish regulation AFS,
2001, occupational health and safety (OHS) is managed in a sys-
tematic way with regular safety audits and follow-ups, as well as
risk analyses. The responsibility for OHS lies with the CEO, but
can be delegated to deputy managers. Some white-collar staff at
the company work full-time on environment, health & safety
(EHS). The company has a close collaboration with the labor orga-
nization for workers in steel manufacturing, regarding health and
safety issues. Throughout the company there are employees who
have the part-time task of being a safety delegate, appointed by
the local labor organization. The safety delegates and the work-
place section managers conduct safety audits together, normally
every second week. Safety delegates within departments have
regular meetings. A senior safety delegate at the company works
full-time as head of the local labor organization.
If an accident occurs, the company is required to take mea-
sures to prevent the event from reoccurring. The company uses
a web-based incident reporting system that has been developed
by AFA Insurance, an insurance company owned by the Swedish
labor market parties (AFA Insurance, 2013). All incidents at work
should be reported in the system: near misses, accidents, and
work injuries, as well as risk observations. If near misses are
repeatedly reported from some part of the production line, the
company is required to take measures to make a sustainable
change. Every incident case in the system creates some action
for improvement, which is followed up before the case can be
marked as closed. There is an around-the-clock, on-call safety
service available within the company that should be called in
case of a severe incident. Every employee has the right to stop
the production if they feel that safety is in jeopardy. The employ-
ees can, apart from using the incident reporting system, talk to
their manager directly if they wish to call attention to somesafety matter, or talk to the local safety delegates for help and
support.
Considering its occupational health and safety standards, the
company sampled was judged as a typical case (Patton, 1990). In
other words, it was thought to be quite average among other large
Swedish steel-manufacturing companies, and therefore we judged
it as an appropriate context to study in order to address the
research aim.2.3. Recruitment strategy and participants
A sample of participants from all ﬁve departments at the steel-
manufacturing company was used to achieve maximum variation
(Patton, 1990). We aimed to get ten focus groups, with about six
to eight employees in each group. To help the participants feel
comfortable in discussing safety at their own workplace, it was
considered important that the participants in each focus group
be colleagues from the same department and the same shift team,
to share the same frame of reference. Two shift teams per depart-
ment were randomly selected from stafﬁng-lists, and then employ-
ees from these shift teams were randomly selected and invited to
the focus group interviews. The department managers and their
deputy managers helped to facilitate the recruitment of partici-
pants to be interviewed, by informing the selected employees
about the study. Written information describing the study was
given to potential participants by their deputy managers, and they
could agree or decline to participate. If they declined to participate,
the next employee on the stafﬁng-list was approached by the dep-
uty manager. The invited employees mainly chose to participate in
the focus groups. They were informed about the day and time
when the interview was going to take place. The deputy managers
then informed the research group when sufﬁcient employees had
accepted to participate in each interview. A total of 66 employees
participated in ten groups (Table 1). Characteristics of the partici-
pants are described in Table 2.2.4. Data collection
The deputy managers of the departments helped to set up a
date for the interview and a meeting room where it could be held.
The interviews were held in facilities that varied between depart-
ments, mostly a meeting or conference room, but sometimes a
lunch room. The semi-structured interviews were conducted by
the ﬁrst author with help from an assistant. The interviewer facil-
itated the interviews by posing questions and elaborating on the
topic when appropriate. The assistant did not participate in the dis-
cussions during the interviews but took notes. The interviewer
started the interviews by telling the participants about the purpose
of the study, hence repeating the information that had been given
in the information letter. Thereafter, a written consent of every
Table 2
Characteristics of the participants (n = 66).
Men 42
Women 24
Safety delegates 12
Mean age (range) 44 (19–63)
Mean years employed by the company (range) 19 (<1–43)
Total years employed by the company 1245
Table 3
The main results of the study: A description of safety culture and reasons for risk-
taking at a large steel manufacturing company.
Categories Subcategories
Acceptance of risks Danger tolerance
Fatalistic beliefs
Individual responsibility for safety Up to the individual
Low company commitment
Trade-off between productivity and
safety
Management expectations
Worker expectations
Practical obstacles
Importance of communication To think about safety
Collaboration between
colleagues
Reporting incidents
State-of-the-day and external conditions New at work
Tiredness
Nonchalance
Routine
Low stafﬁng
High pace
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interviews none of the invited participants chose to drop out.
An interview guide was developed for the present study
(Appendix A). The three main themes discussed were exempliﬁed
by the questions ‘‘What is safety like at your workplace?’’ ‘‘How
is safety handled at your workplace?’’ ‘‘What could be improved
regarding safety at your workplace?’’ These themes were rendered
on signs on the table, visible to the participants. The interview
guide had some subtopics for each of the themes and open
questions, where participants could not answer simply ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no,’’ were asked at every occasion possible, as well as follow-up
questions, for example: ‘‘Please explain more; what does that
mean?’’ and ‘‘Do you have an example?’’ Descriptive data of the
participants (Table 2) was collected after closing the interview
session. For this, they were asked to ﬁll out a short questionnaire.
Each focus group interview lasted for about 75 min and was
conducted during June, July, and September in 2011. The focus
group interviews were recorded digitally and thereafter tran-
scribed verbatim. The interview assistant was present in the ﬁrst
eight interviews and transcribed the recordings afterwards.
2.5. Analysis
The analytic framework of qualitative content analysis accord-
ing to Graneheim and Lundman (2004) was used in the analysis.
The analysis was built on codes, which were sorted into categories
and subcategories. Firstly, the interview transcripts were read
through by the interviewer while listening to the recordings, to
make corrections in the text. Each interview was read at least once
without any simultaneous coding. The initial analysis and the cod-
ing of data were conducted by the ﬁrst author, while the co-
authors took parts of the material and worked with the analysis
during meetings throughout the analytical process. Codes were
written as short sentences that mirrored the content of text seg-
ments in order not to lose information contained in the text and
to maintain ﬁdelity to the material. In the conduct of the analysis,
safety culture was considered as consisting of normative beliefs
and fundamental values (assumptions, expectations, philosophies,
norms, and rules), with regard to safety at a workplace (Mearns
and Flin, 1999). Text segments in which it was judged that partic-
ipants gave descriptions of safety that were normative or based on
values were identiﬁed as meaning units and coded. Reasons for
risk-taking were coded during the analysis, in which text segments
with explicit reasons for risk-taking were identiﬁed as meaning
units and coded. The coding of the data was inductive in the sense
that codes and categories were derived from the data and not iden-
tiﬁed in advance. The codes and categories were shaped and
named (abstracted) successively during the analysis and were
not based on the questions in the interview guide. The qualitative
data analysis software Atlas.ti 6.2 (ATLAS.ti GmbH, Berlin) was
partly used in the analysis to code and sort the data.
3. Results
The analysis resulted in ﬁve categories (Table 3) that describes
the safety culture and reasons for risk-taking, and how they wereperceived and experienced by employees at a large steel-manufac-
turing company. The categories were acceptance of risks, individual
responsibility for safety, trade-off between productivity and safety,
importance of communication, and state-of-the-day and external con-
ditions. The ﬁve categories were in turn based on sixteen subcate-
gories. The categories and subcategories are presented in the
following text.3.1. Acceptance of risks
In the experience of the steel-industry workers, the risks that
are present in their work environment have to be accepted, since
there is not so much to do about them than to make the best of
the situation. The ﬁrst subcategory was danger tolerance that it is
a dangerous work environment and one must accept and handle
risks. The workers reported that there are large forces in their
workplace, and one cannot completely avoid risks. The following
examples illustrate that they consider risks to be everywhere,
including outside of the workplace: ‘‘There are risks everywhere,
driving the car is a risk in itself, but that is not something one
thinks about’’ (CRTM, 5), and ‘‘It is actually a heavy industry, it is
not possible to ‘bolster’ everything’’ (SM, 10). The workers use
shortcuts on the job that make the work more risky, which is per-
ceived as acceptable, if one masters them. Despite one’s own safety
awareness, one is always dependent on others in the workplace,
and how they act: ‘‘It does not matter how good you are yourself
to think of everything; there will always be fools around you’’
(RM, 6). A stressful work pace is dangerous but hard to avoid,
which is accepted and handled: ‘‘One should not stress. It should
take the time it takes, but it automatically happens sometimes that
one does stress’’ (CRTM, 5).
The workers also expressed fatalistic beliefs that one accepts
how safety is, and that some things cannot change. The workers
did not believe that an accident-free and healthy workplace would
ever be achievable. They believed that human errors make it
impossible to reach a zero-accident vision, or that poor air condi-
tions could ever be avoided: ‘‘It will never be possible to achieve
one hundred percent safety; nothing can become one hundred per-
cent’’ (SM, 10), and ‘‘One cannot get away from the fact that human
error plays a role sometimes’’ (BM, 7). The workers experienced,
though, that ‘‘It is a wonder that so few accidents happen, consid-
ering the type of heavy industry that it actually is’’ (RM, 1). All in
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because it is just how it is.
3.2. Individual responsibility for safety
The steel-industry workers expressed that the individual
worker, through common sense, has responsibility for safe proce-
dures, since one cannot count on the company for that. The ﬁrst
subcategory was that it is up to the individual to work in a safe
manner. The workers stated that one cannot rely on the manager
or the company to take responsibility for safety during a work
shift; one needs to do that oneself, because safety rests on the
judgment and decisions of the individual during a work task:
‘‘No one else can take that responsibility, the individual has the
largest responsibility’’ (BM, 4). One’s own common sense was per-
ceived to be crucial: ‘‘It is all about knowledge and common sense’’
(HRTM, 2), and ‘‘One has to think before acting’’ (CRTM, 8). One
should come prepared to the workplace (for example, by having
had enough rest), and one should take responsibility for one’s
own safety during work; no one else can do it for you: ‘‘Personal
responsibility—everybody needs to see the risks’’ (HRTM, 2).
Low company commitment was the second subcategory, in that
the company does not manage the safety procedures as much as
it could. The workers experienced how, if one points out a concern
regarding safety, it gets treated nonchalantly by the company:
‘‘Sometimes there is nonchalance about what we say and what
we think is dangerous’’ (HRTM, 2), and ‘‘They spend more time
on ﬁnding ‘scapegoats’ than on ﬁxing problems’’ (SM, 9). When
an agreement for a safety improvement has been settled, it can
‘‘take ages’’ before the company acts to implement the change.
The company can as well be reluctant to stop production when it
is requested by the employees due to safety concerns. However,
if something acute happens concerning safety, a severe near miss
or an accident, the company acts quickly to implement improve-
ments. The workers perceived that it is good that the company
then acts quickly, but that it is too bad that something needs to
happen before measures are taken: ‘‘When one reports things that
they need to ﬁx, they do not take care of it, and then when some-
thing happens, yeah, then they take care of it’’ (CRTM, 5).
3.3. Trade-off between productivity and safety
The steel-industry workers described that a trade-off exists
between productivity and safety—that they are conﬂicting entities,
wanting to produce as well as wanting to work safely, with practi-
cal obstacles to working safely sometimes. The ﬁrst subcategory
was management expectations, that one perceives expectations
from the management that productivity has priority over safety.
The workers perceived that there is an expectation from the man-
agement that, even though there is low stafﬁng one day, it should
not result in less productivity. The workers’ experiences show that
when stafﬁng goes down, accidents go up. The management does
not want the production to slow down, and therefore, as the work-
ers explained, they need to ﬁnd temporary solutions and work
with tools that are not appropriate for the job, or to work with
equipment that is broken or does not work properly: ‘‘The manage-
ment says that one should use the different aids there are, but if
one really would do that to the fullest, then one slows down pro-
duction, and they do not like that either’’ (RM, 1). Temporary solu-
tions were perceived as necessary to get the production running
again quickly when a stoppage occurs.
The next subcategory was worker expectations, that the workers
themselves consider it important to make the production run
smoothly, which is the ﬁrst priority. The workers described that
they have their own expectations that production should run
smoothly: ‘‘We are a bit foolish ourselves, really; one wants to keepthe production going, which is how it is’’ (RM, 1). They feel that
they want to keep the production running, as the production is
the reason for being there: ‘‘One should take care of liquid steel,
which is the ﬁrst priority’’ (SM, 9). They also expressed that one
wants to spare the equipment and save material, when something
goes wrong in the production. By doing so, one is subjected to more
risk. But apart from avoiding discarding material as scrap, one also
minimizes the work effort by having a short interruption instead of
a long stoppage of the production.
Practical obstacles, was the third subcategory of this category,
that one wants to work in a safe manner, but there are practical
obstacles to doing so. The steel-industry workers experienced that
there as well are practical difﬁculties for working in a safe manner,
if one would like to do that. The right equipment or tools might not
be available, or might have broken down, for example, lift trucks.
Therefore inappropriate equipment and tools are used instead:
‘‘We can make it easy for us, take the absolutely safest way, but
then we will not produce so damn much’’ (RM, 1).
3.4. Importance of communication
The steel-industry workers experienced that communication is
needed for safety actions to be effective, through experience and
training, taking responsibility for collaboration, and making sure
to communicate incidents that happen. The ﬁrst subcategory was
to think about safety, that it is important to have continuous safety
training and to learn how to ‘‘think safety’’ (1.4.1). The workers
perceived that safety training is important and that one cannot
get too much of it: ‘‘One has to know what one is doing’’ (HRTM,
2). They also perceived that a newly employed person should learn
about safety ﬁrst, before learning the production. They also
reported that there is not enough time for introducing new staff
to production and safety: ‘‘There is a staff shortage, so there is
not enough time for them to get the training that really is
needed—often it is too short’’ (HRTM, 2). They stated that newly
employed persons create a more dangerous workplace around
them, since they are less experienced and take more risks.
Collaboration between colleagues was the next subcategory, that
communication and collaboration between colleagues at the work-
place is important for safety. The workers experienced the possibil-
ity of communicating as very important for safety at the
workplace. The use of walkie-talkies is more efﬁcient than using
body language and gestures, which often still are used. It is also
important to feel comfortable with one another in order to work
in a safe manner, to know each other’s personalities and stand-
points: ‘‘We talk a lot to one another between the cockpits, and
then we get the safety to work really well’’ (BM, 4). They consid-
ered that pointing out someone’s risk behavior is the right thing
to do, but also a sensitive matter, and that one needs common
sense in approaching the colleague who has made a mistake or
taken a risk. Otherwise, one can be faced with the attitude that
‘‘No one should tell me how to do my job’’ and ‘‘Mind your own
business, and I’ll mind mine’’ (RM, 1). They also emphasized that
neglecting safety procedures should be punished, requesting more
strict control over violations of safety regulations.
Reporting incidents was the third subcategory, that one should
report incidents, even though there may be obstacles to doing so.
The workers stated that they know that it is important to report
incidents (risk observations, near misses, and accidents), but still,
the incident reporting is often ignored. They experienced writing
incident reports as time consuming, and there was uncertainty
about how to do it. It was related that, ‘‘If we were to report every-
thing that happens, we would have to write the whole time’’ (SM,
10). Embarrassment is another reason not to report incidents,
embarrassment about being foolish and making a mistake. They
described that it is embarrassing enough that the mistake
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one’s own mistake.
3.5. State-of-the-day and external conditions
The steel-industry workers described how interplay between
one’s state-of-the-day and the external work environment condi-
tions present at the workplace results in the individual taking dif-
ferent risks. The ﬁrst subcategory illuminating this was that being
new at work results in unaware risk-taking. The workers reported
that new employees take more risks, because they are less experi-
enced: ‘‘Experience is lacking; they just rush in and do not think
about where they are going’’ (HRTM, 3), and ‘‘When someone is
new, they do not see the dangers, which one learns about over
the years’’ (HRTM, 3). New employees are often told that ‘‘You
should do what I say, not what I do’’ (BM, 7).
The next subcategory was tiredness, that being tired results in
more risk-taking. The workers described that tiredness can be
inﬂuenced by amount of sleep, time of the day because of shift
work, the hot work environment, and slumberous sounds from
machines. This was, for example, described as follows: ‘‘We are
shift workers, and one can be terribly sleepy sometimes,’’ and
‘‘Four o’clock in the morning, one does not think so damn well’’
(HRTM, 2), and ‘‘Perhaps one is tired and does not think before act-
ing, being poorly prepared for work’’ (BM, 4).
Nonchalance about the safety risks results in more risk-taking
and was the third subcategory. The workers experienced that non-
chalance toward risks is a common problem: ‘‘A bit of nonchalance
is pretty common’’ (HRTM, 2). A more experienced worker may be
more nonchalant, being unobservant or underestimating risks:
‘‘One does not think before. . .’’ (CRTM, 8). Nonchalance was also
described as being present because of laziness or because one
wants to minimize the work effort.
Working on routine and being ‘‘blind to ﬂaws’’ results in more
risk-taking. The steel-industry workers described being ‘‘blind to
ﬂaws’’ as meaning that one follows certain routines during work,
becoming blind to risks that one should see: ‘‘It is routine. One gets
accustomed to being out in production, and one does not think.
One does what one should, but does not think about what one is
doing’’ (CRTM, 5). It was described as a risky state of mind that
occurs after one gets accustomed to the workplace, which is hard
to be aware of: ‘‘Maybe someone from the outside comes and sees
something, and reacts much more strongly than we do, since we
have seen it a hundred times already’’ (HRTM, 3). They perceived
that being blind to ﬂaws is the opposite of being new at work,
but that both these states are dangerous.
The next subcategory was low stafﬁng, that too few staff to do
the job results in more risk-taking. The workers experienced that
low stafﬁng on a shift team is bad for safety, since the workers
have to take more risks because of the extra workload: ‘‘Even if
there is a temporary cut-down of the staff, it is expected that pro-
duction should not be affected, and one has the mindset to ‘go at it’
and maintain the production, even though that is a bit wrong, since
it involves more risk-taking’’ (RM, 1).
High pacewas the sixth subcategory, in that to stress, hurry, and
work faster in order to save time results in more risk-taking. The
workers cited some examples of how one stresses and works faster
to save time when in a hurry: loading transports with more weight
than they are intended to carry, in order to ﬁnish more quickly;
performing maintenance on running machines without stopping
the production process, to keep production ﬂowing; forgetting to
communicate with colleagues; lifting heavy loads and lifting the
wrong way; and using the wrong tools, because the right ones
are missing or broken. They described that stressing and being in
a hurry might occur because of the demand to meet a deadline,
or just to get the work done quickly so that one can get some restafterwards: ‘‘Being under stress is when one starts to use short-
cuts’’ (RM, 6), and ‘‘If one can solve it quickly, one gets less work,
and one can go and sit down’’ (HRTM, 2). Colleagues expect the
shift team before them not to leave any work behind; therefore,
there sometimes is a need to ﬁnish the planned production under
time pressure.4. Discussion
As an overall ﬁnding, it can be summarized that responsibility
and actions for a functioning safety performance was perceived
to rest on the individual, whereas the work environment and prior-
ity of productivity constitute constant obstacles. This showed to be
experiences of the workers that were prominent throughout the
analyzed material. The results concerns expectations and bound-
aries: partly the expectations the workers have of themselves and
the expectations they experience from managers, and partly how
the organization and the work environment set boundaries as to
how it is possible to act in different situations. The results there-
fore ﬁt rather well with the concept of human-technology-organi-
zation (HTO), where there are interactions between each of the
three components in systems, as well as mutual interdependence
between them (Berglund and Karltun, 2007; Rollenhagen, 1997).
Thus, our results in relation to the HTO-concept show that the
workers (human) operate within the boundaries set by the physi-
cal environment and the machines (technology), as well as under
the expectations set by managers and conventional working proce-
dures (organization). The experiences of the workers showed that
it is partly individual factors (human) and partly external factors
(technology, organization) that contribute to risk-taking at work.
Workers’ expectations of themselves, and expectations of manag-
ers for the workers, constitute a culture that governs how it is pos-
sible to act (behavior). That culture matters for behavior in the
context of safety has been demonstrated by Watson et al. (2005),
in that norms shared by employees predict perceptions of safety
as well as risk behavior.
There are different schools of thought on organizational safety
and why incidents occur: person as cause, system as cause, or sys-
tem–person sequence as cause (Brown et al., 2000). The latter is in
line with the HTO-concept. The HTO-concept is a variant of classic
sociotechnical systems theory that acknowledges that there are
interactions between social and technical factors in organizations
and thereby a need to review the whole of a system in order to
improve performance and ‘joint optimization’ (Cooper and Foster,
1971). An earlier study conducted in the steel industry found sup-
port for a sociotechnical model in explaining safe/unsafe work
behaviors (Brown et al., 2000). A sociotechnical understanding of
safety culture has been suggested by, for example, Grote and
Künzler (2000) and Nævestad (2009). The results of the present
study are also in line with the HTO-concept and a sociotechnical
understanding of safety culture and risk-taking.
Risk-taking and unsafe behaviors in an organization is partly a
result of how the culture is shaped, as demonstrated by earlier
studies in an industrial manufacturing context (Brown et al.,
2000; Canter, 1996; Turtiainen and Vaananen, 2012; Watson
et al., 2005). Culture can, of course, contribute to either unsafe or
safe behaviors in an organization. Culture is however not behavior
per se and should not be confused as such. We agree with Myers
et al. (2014) that it is important to distinguish between culture
and behavior, and not to oversimplify by saying that culture is
‘the way we do things around here’. It is, however, interesting to
discuss how cultural norms are related to behavior since they do
specify what kind of behavior is acceptable or wanted. Safety cul-
ture is one factor that contributes to behavior, but there are many
other factors. The will to comply with the culture of work
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safety rules. Mullen (2004) showed that in order for workers to
keep their status in the workplace, they had to follow the social
norms, which resulted in unsafe behavior since they did not adhere
to safety rules. Reputation as well as punishment are incentives to
comply with social norms (Teraji, 2013).
We would like to discuss further three aspects of the results.
First is the trade-off between productivity and safety, where pro-
duction targets and production pressures are perceived to get pri-
ority over safety procedures. Through the worker’s descriptions it
was made evident that an important incentive for employees to
risk their safety, by, for example, taking a short cut by not using
the appropriate tools, was to get the production running again as
soon as possible if a stoppage occurs. This illustrates the cultural
expression that there is a constant and ongoing trade-off between
productivity, on the one hand, and safety, on the other, which has
been found in similar ways in earlier studies (Antonsen, 2009a;
Atak and Kingma, 2011; Brown et al., 2000; Nazaruk, 2011;
Walker, 2008). One example is a study at an oil platform
(Antonsen, 2009a), which showed that wishing to meet production
targets was a dominant cultural value. The trade-off between pro-
ductivity and safety may be a fundamental and built-in feature of
production systems. Trade-offs, taking shortcuts, and ignoring safe
procedures can be interpreted as expressions of human innovation,
creativity, and problem-solving to performwork tasks, which how-
ever, are unwanted features if it results in safety being put aside. At
the same time, human innovation, creativity, and problem-solving
are often mentioned as important prerequisites for working safely,
as they permit the worker to adapt to situational challenges that
arise (e.g. Antonsen et al., 2012; Hollnagel et al., 2006;
Rasmussen, 1997). This illustrates the two sides of human innova-
tion in safety critical contexts: it can result in safe as well as unsafe
acts.
The tension between productivity and safety is an example of
how compliance or non-compliance with safety rules become vis-
ible (Battmann and Klumbb, 1993). The workers of the present
study stated that common sense is important during their work.
Similarly, in a study of Norwegian ﬁshermen it was shown that
instead of complying with safety rules, they rather trusted their
common sense to work safely (Thorvaldsen, 2013). The company
investigated in the present study, as introduced earlier in the study
context section, is compliant with established legislations and
standards. However, the company on the one hand and the work-
ers on the other, can be said to have different interests and ideas
regarding what a satisfactory performance of productivity and
safety is (Targoutzidis, 2011). In a study by Blazsin and
Guldenmund (2015), workers perceived that safe and relevant
working practices preferably should be developed in the ﬁeld,
rather than being imposed on them by corporate rules. Also, simi-
lar to the workers in the present study, these workers perceived it
to be impossible to achieve complete safety, that individual
responsibility is important, and that rules sometimes can be obsta-
cles to working smoothly and efﬁciently (Blazsin and Guldenmund,
2015). Two different viewpoints can be found in the literature,
either to consider that safety rules always must be adhered to
and that violations should be suppressed, or that operators are
experts and rule violations are a natural and dynamic way to adjust
to reality (Hale and Borys, 2013). Either way, the reasons to violate
safety rules have been found to be multifactorial (Alper and Karsh,
2009).
It is concerning that safety often seems to have to take a back-
seat to productivity, and that rules are violated to get the job done.
This might be a ‘‘cultural universal,’’ a common feature found in
every society (Giddens, 1989), similar to the existence of gift-giv-
ing, property rights, or the institution of marriage. Even though
the workers themselves feel it is important to prioritize produc-tion, they also experience expectations from managers that pro-
ductivity has priority over safety. There are similarities with the
present study and Haukelid (2008, p. 421), in that the workers in
that study experienced that ‘‘Safety rules are ok – but it takes too
long time if we always should follow them!’’ Based on descriptions
given by the workers of the present study we would like to sum up
a ﬁctional dialogue between the management and the workers:
The management: You should use the right equipment and safe
procedures when you work.
The workers: Ok, but if we do that, we cannot produce as much
as you want us to.
The management: Now we need you to produce this and this
much in order to reach our targets.
The workers: Ok, but then we do not have time to use the right
equipment and safe procedures, or to rest and take breaks.
The justiﬁcation for trade-offs between productivity and safety
appears to be circular reasoning. The workers may be able to justify
trade-offs, but at the same time they also perceive to carry much of
the responsibility for safe working procedures.
Second, we would like to discuss the ﬁnding that the responsi-
bility for safe procedures rests to the largest extent on the individ-
ual. The workers experienced that a functioning safety
performance at work is up to the individual, depending on oneself,
and that one actually cannot count on either colleagues or the
manager when it really comes down to it. Earlier studies have also
found the responsibility for safety to rest on the individual
(Edwards and Jabs, 2009; Lee, 1998; Walker, 2008). This ﬁnding
can be explained by the fact that individual responsibility is quite
important in shift work, since there are periods during a day when
there is no manager present, only workers. Another explanation
could be that the organizational structure of the present company
is fairly ﬂat and not strictly top-down, and therefore, the responsi-
bilities are divided. It is perhaps counterintuitive to some that the
workers actually experience safety as a personal responsibility,
rather than believing that safety is something for the management
to arrange, which in part is what legislation speciﬁes (AFS, 2001;
SFS, 1977; 89/391/ECC). In a quite logical sense the responsibility
for safety, of course, rests on the individuals, since they are the
ones that perform the work. Lee (1998, p. 236) postulates that a
main principle of safety culture is that ‘‘the responsibility for safety
is devolved to every employee in the organization.’’ In line with
Lee, the company of the present study could be said to have a posi-
tive safety culture, since the workers experience safety as their
responsibility. On the other hand, the workers also perceived that
the management was absent and not responsive to their wishes or
concerns regarding safety. This in turn indicate a negative safety
culture, since earlier ﬁndings have shown the commitment of man-
agement to be associated with positive safety culture, positive
employee safety behavior, and positive employee safety attitudes
(Biggs et al., 2013; Cox et al., 1998; Fernández-Muñiz et al.,
2007). The workers interviewed for the present study did at times
also express that they would welcome more strict control over
safety violations and that the management should care and punish
more, but at the same time they also expressed how safety really is
the responsibility of the individual—which indicates some ambiv-
alence. The perception that safety is the responsibility of the indi-
vidual is likely learned and transferred between the workers, and
therefore a part of the socialization-process in the workplace.
Third, we would like to discuss the cultural circumstances sur-
rounding the socialization of new employees. According to the
workers of the present study, a newly employed person can see
the workplace with ‘‘fresh eyes’’ and is not yet ‘‘blind,’’ and can
therefore see things that the experienced workers cannot see,
which was valued as a good thing. However, as the years pass
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others in the organization have. Unfortunately, though, the experi-
enced workers of the staff do not make use of the newly arrived
fresh pair of eyes, because there are norms that say that newly
employed persons should not point out anything or come with
suggestions for improvement, and if they do, they are reprimanded
by experienced colleagues right away. This is an interesting para-
dox: that a fresh view of the organization is a valued matter, but
that, at the same time, putting the fresh view to use is considered
as an unwanted behavior within the team. This could be explained
by underlying status differences between newly employed and
experienced workers. Amount of experience matter in the work
team, which inﬂuences roles and relationships between the work-
ers. A theoretical perspective ﬁrst introduced by Harris (1970), and
later used by Hale (1995), uses the metaphor of parent–child and
adult–adult relationships to analyze roles and relationships in jobs.
‘‘Parent–child relationships are often immature and disturbed, par-
ticularly if one person is unhappy with their (usually) child role.
They are characterized by power games and dominance rituals.
On the other hand adult–adult relationships are mature and con-
centrated on mutual support and the achievement of common
goals’’ (Hale, 1995, p. 236). It seems applicable to label the relation-
ship between experienced workers and new workers as a parent–
child relationship, with power games and dominance rituals,
where the newly employed workers are not permitted to come
with improvement suggestions. When the new workers have
gained enough experience the roles turn into an adult–adult rela-
tionship, but thereto they also unfortunately become ‘‘blind to
ﬂaws.’’ The interviewed workers themselves commented on the
above-described socialization process for new employees, and
noted that such a cultural expression seems a bit foolish and
unwise. What also takes place is that new employees are
instructed by the experienced workers on how the work should
be done, but then the experienced workers do not follow that work
protocol themselves, which results in contradictory information to
the new workers.
4.1. Methodological considerations
An advantage of using focus group interviews when studying
culture is that shared knowledge and experiences can be identiﬁed
in order to explore cultural values and norms in groups, more than
what would be the case with individual interviews (Hughes and
DuMont, 1993; Kitzinger, 1995). The dynamics between partici-
pants in focus groups is the key to ﬁnd shared knowledge and
experiences. A disadvantage with group dynamics, though, is that
the ‘‘articulation of group norms may silence individual voices of
dissent’’ (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 300). Individuals in the group may
refrain from stating their point of view. In order to encourage the
workers to discuss the topic in this study, each focus group con-
sisted of members from the same shift team, which facilitated a
familiar and ‘‘true’’ interaction between them.
As it was the deputy managers who approached the workers
regarding participation in the study, the workers could have felt
coerced to participate, perceiving participating as a work task. Nev-
ertheless, the workers’ voluntariness was secured by informing
them that it was fully optional to participate. This was done with
the written information letter that the deputy managers handed
out, orally on the day on the interviews, as well as printed on the
form for their written consent. We do not believe this recruitment
strategy was negative for the participants or the study in any way.
In the present study some measures have been taken to address
trustworthiness, as described by Graneheim and Lundman (2004).
First, to address credibility, we included many participants, a rather
large sample, to achieve a rich variation of the phenomena under
study, using maximum variation sampling (Patton, 1990). Duringanalysis, the effort to identify appropriate meaning units was as
well crucial for credibility. In order to strengthen credibility of
the analysis, all authors of this article took part of the material
and worked with the analysis during the process, separately and
through recurring meetings. The coding of the data was done by
the ﬁrst author. The coding and categorization process was contin-
ually discussed within the research group. Any possible differences
in opinions among the authors were resolved by discussing the
interview source material. For the ﬁnal results, consensus was
reached.
Second, to address dependability (interpreting data differently or
making different decisions during the course of analysis), an anal-
ysis logbook was kept. The analysis and coding were performed
inductively, with the awareness not to base them on the questions
in the interview guide. Third, transferability is how well ﬁndings
can be considered to be applicable to other settings or groups
(Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). We therefore made an effort to
describe the context of the present study thoroughly, to allow
the reader to judge the transferability of the ﬁndings to other set-
tings. The ﬁndings may be especially applicable to other settings
with similar manufacturing, similar national legislation, and simi-
lar close collaboration between employer representatives and
labor organization representatives.
4.2. Future research
For future research it is suggested that more qualitative descrip-
tive studies of safety culture be undertaken in other occupational
contexts. Basic research of this kind can support further develop-
ment of safety culture theory-building and contribute to reﬁne-
ments of quantitative instruments that measure safety culture.
Much of the efforts within the research ﬁeld, which uses the ana-
lytical concept of safety culture, fall back on the striving toward
constructing quantitative measures that reliably and accurately
can indicate an organization’s proneness to future incidents. We
recommend that a sociological deﬁnition of safety culture be used
in future research (Giddens, 1989; Mearns and Flin, 1999), return-
ing to the roots of the concept of culture (Antonsen, 2009b;
Edwards et al., 2013; Haukelid, 2008; Myers et al., 2014). We also
propose that, in moving forward, the theoretical development of
safety culture should focus more on shared values, norms, and atti-
tudes of safety, than on de facto safety management compliance in
organizations.
4.3. Conclusions
An overall ﬁnding was that responsibility and actions for a func-
tioning safety performance was perceived to rest on the individual,
whereas the work environment and priority of productivity consti-
tute constant obstacles.
The steel-industry workers perceived that the risks that are
present in their work environment have to be accepted, since there
is not so much to do about it than to make the best of the situation.
They also experienced that a functioning safety performance at
work is the responsibility of the individual, and that one actually
cannot count on either colleagues or the manager when it really
comes down to it. The workers reported that there is a constant
and ongoing trade-off between productivity, on the one hand,
and safety, on the other, and that they are conﬂicting entities,
wanting to produce as well as wanting to work safely, with practi-
cal obstacles to working safely sometimes. The workers experi-
enced that the possibility to communicate is very important for
safety at the workplace. They also described interplay between
one’s state-of-the-day and the external work environment condi-
tions at the workplace, which results in the individual taking dif-
ferent risks. The ﬁndings of this study are interpreted to be in
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(HTO), and a sociotechnical understanding of safety culture and
risk-taking.
4.4. Recommendations for industry
New employees are acclimatized into a safety culture at work.
The workers of this study pointed out about how new employees
often have a fresh view of the organization, which is quite valuable,
but that using these fresh perspectives often is considered as an
unwanted behavior by the more experienced workers within the
team. Managers in industry could be aware of this and make an
effort to put a fresh view of the organization to use before the
new employees become ‘‘blind to ﬂaws.’’
A sociotechnical understanding of safety culture and risk-taking
was supported by the present study, it is therefore suggested that
companies should consider a holistic approach when designing
system improvements (to strengthen company performance
jointly with safety and well-being for the workers).
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Appendix A
The interview guide: Was used in a semi-structured manner
and had three main themes and some subtopics.
Theme 1: What is safety like at your workplace?
Importance of safety at the workplace, of working safely
How high safety is valued in the organization
Risk-taking at the company—allowed, not allowed
Correction of colleagues if violating safety procedure
Theme 2: How is safety handled at your workplace?
Safety arrangements at the workplace
Thinking, not thinking, about safety at work
People involved in safety management
Tools, equipment, to work in a safe manner
Hazardous situations at the workplace
Safety problems at the workplace
Theme 3: What could be improved regarding safety at your
workplace?
Improving safety at the workplace
Reasons for work injuries at the workplace
Reasons for risk-taking at the workplace
Missing in safety management
Creating good safetyReferences
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